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We compared aberration detection methods requiring
historical data to those that require little background by
using simulated data. Methods that require less historical
data are as sensitive and specific as those that require 3–5
years of data. These simulations can determine which
method produces appropriate sensitivity and specificity.
T
he Early Aberration Reporting System (EARS) was
developed to allow analysis of public health surveil-
lance data. Several alternative aberration detection meth-
ods are available to state and local health departments for
syndromic surveillance. Before 2001, most statistical aber-
ration detection methods required at least 5 years of back-
ground data (1–6). However, with the release of Bacillus
anthracis in the U.S. mail shortly after the September 11,
2001, World Trade Center attacks, substantial interest has
emerged in public health tools that could be rapidly imple-
mented without requiring years of background data. Newly
developed nonhistorical aberration detection methods can
require as little as 1 week of data to begin analysis,
although they have not been extensively evaluated against
traditional historical methods (7,8).
The objective of our study was to determine the sensi-
tivity, specificity, and time to detection of 3 methods that
require <3 years of historical baseline data, C1–MILD
(C1), C2–MEDIUM (C2), and C3–ULTRA(C3), and com-
pare the results with those of 2 methods that require 5
years of historical baseline, the historical limits method (2)
and the seasonally adjusted cumulative sum (CUSUM) (5),
based on simulated data. Simulated data were used to
avoid some of the interpretation difficulties that can come
from making these comparisons on the basis of empirical-
ly observed, natural disease data. All 5 of these methods
are components of EARS (7).
The Study
The methods C1, C2, and C3 were named according to
their degree of sensitivity, with C1 being the least sensitive
and C3 the most sensitive. All 3 methods are based on a
positive 1-sided CUSUM calculation. For C1 and C2, the
CUSUM threshold reduces to the mean plus 3 standard
deviations (SD). The mean and SD for the C1 calculation
are based on information from the past 7 days. The mean
and SD for the C2 and C3 calculations are based on infor-
mation from 7 days, ignoring the 2 most recent days. These
methods take into consideration daily variation because
the mean and SD used by the methods are based on a
week’s information. These methods also take seasonality
into consideration because the mean and SD are calculated
in the same season as the data value in question.
Since 1989, results from the historical limits method
have been used to produce Figure 1 in the Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report. This method compares the num-
ber of reported cases in the 4 most recent time periods for
a given health outcome with historical incidence data on
the same outcome from the preceding 5 years; the method
is based on comparing the ratio of current reports with the
historical mean and SD. The historical mean and SD are
derived from 15 totals of 3 intervals (including the same 4
periods, the preceding 4 periods, and the subsequent 4
periods over the preceding 5 years of historical data).
The seasonally adjusted CUSUM method is based on
the positive 1-sided CUSUM where the count of interest is
compared to the 5-year mean and the 5-year SD for that
period. The seasonally adjusted CUSUM was originally
applied to laboratory-based Salmonella serotype data. 
To calculate sensitivity, specificity, and time to detec-
tion, all 5 detection methods of EARS were used to inde-
pendently analyze 56,000 sets of artificially generated
case-count data based on 56 sets of parameters. These 56
sets of parameters each generated 1,000 iterations of 6
years of daily data, 1994–1999, by using a negative bino-
mial distribution with superimposed outbreaks. Means and
standard deviations were based on observed values from
national and local public health systems and syndromic sur-
veillance systems. Examples of the data included national
and state pneumonia and influenza data and hospital
influenzalike illness. Adjustments were made for days of
the week, holidays, postholiday periods, seasonality, and
trend. Any 6 years could be used, but the years 1994–1999
were used to set day of the week and holiday patterns and
to avoid any problems that programs might have with the
year 2000. Fifty (89%) of these datasets then had outbreaks
superimposed throughout the data. Three types of out-
breaks were used, each representing various types of natu-
rally occurring events: log normal, a rapidly increasing
outbreak; inverted log normal, a slowly starting outbreak;
and a single-day spike. These types of outbreaks were com-
bined with different SDs and incubation times to create 10
different types of outbreaks that had equal probability of
being included in the simulated data. A year of final simu-
lated data can be seen in the Figure, with original data and
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statistically marked aberrations, or flags, produced by the 5
detection methods were evaluated for their specificity, sen-
sitivity, and time to detection. These data can be obtained at
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/surveillance/ ears/datasets.asp.
In our study, sensitivity was defined as the number of
outbreaks in which >1 day was flagged, divided by the
total number of outbreaks in the data. An outbreak was
defined as a period of consecutive days in which varying
numbers of aberrant cases were added to the baseline num-
ber of cases. An outbreak had days before and after it when
no aberrant cases were added to the baseline case counts.
Specificity was defined as the total number of days that did
not contain aberrant cases (and that were not flagged),
divided by the total number of days that did not contain
aberrant cases. Based on these definitions, actual values
for sensitivity and specificity were calculated.
Time to detection was defined as the number of com-
plete days that occurred between the beginning of an out-
break and the first day the outbreak was flagged. For
example, if a method flags an outbreak on the first day, its
time to detection is 0. Likewise, if it flags on the second
day, its time to detection is 1, and so on. Time to detection
is an average of the times to detection for each outbreak
and dataset. Only outbreaks that were flagged on at least 1
day were included in the average. Therefore, sensitivity is
needed to completely interpret time to detection. We calcu-
lated 2-sided 95% confidence values, and they were rela-
tively small and consistent.
Overall, the CUSUM methods (the seasonally adjusted
CUSUM, C1, C2, and C3) had similar times to detection,
but their sensitivities varied (Table). Specifically, C1, C2,
and C3 showed increasing sensitivity from 60% to 71% to
82%, respectively. The seasonally adjusted CUSUM and
C3 methods had similar sensitivities, 82.5% and 82.3%,
but C3 had a higher specificity, 88.7% and 95.4%. The his-
torical limits and C1 and C2 methods showed varying sen-
sitivities (44%–71%), with C1 and C2 having the highest,
but all demonstrated similar specificities (96%–97%). 
When results were stratified by outbreak type, 1-day
outbreaks (i.e., spikes) exhibited the lowest sensitivities.
Analysis was broken down by dataset and outbreak type
(online Appendix Tables 1 and 2, available at http://www.
cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol11no02/04-0587_app1.htm and
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol11no02/04-0587_
app2.htm).
For the 6 datasets that contained noise but no outbreaks,
no sensitivity or time to detection exist to calculate. The
overall specificity for the seasonally adjusted CUSUM,
historical limits, C1, C2, and C3 were 88.7%, 98.3%,
97.2%, 97.2%, and 95.2%, respectively. The specificity for
these 6 datasets was consistent with general results. The
historical limits method showed superior specificity in all
but the last dataset. 
Conclusions
These simulations demonstrate that the methods for
aberration detection that require little baseline data, C1,
C2, and C3, are as sensitive and specific as the historical
limits and seasonally adjusted CUSUM methods. As
expected, C1, C2, and C3 showed increasing sensitivities
in accordance with their intended sensitivity levels (C1
being the least sensitive, C3 being the most), but with
decreasing specificities as sensitivity increases. Seasonally
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Figure. Example of 1 year of simulated data with simulated out-
breaks. Simulated data are based on real means and standard
deviations with different types of simulated outbreaks randomly
inserted.adjusted CUSUM and the historical limits method also
showed sensitivities and specificities as expected, with the
seasonally adjusted CUSUM having the lower specificity
and higher sensitivity. These findings emphasize the effec-
tiveness of aberration detection methods without requiring
long-term historical data as a baseline.
Since the 10 simulated outbreaks were randomly gener-
ated by using consistent rates, the sensitivity, specificity,
and time to detection could be stratified by dataset and out-
break type. The results of these analyses were largely con-
gruent with the expected findings, with some variations.
The simulated datasets are designed for public health offi-
cials to select a dataset that best reflects their data of inter-
est or the type of outbreak they are anticipating to determine
which method provides them with the sensitivity and speci-
ficity they would find useful. The simulated datasets can
also be used to make comparisons with other methods.
The aberration detection methods C1, C2, and C3 are
used in several states, counties, and local public health
departments. Public health departments are able to apply
these methods to data sources that do not have long peri-
ods of baseline data. Public health departments are also
able to apply 1 set of methods they understand to various
types of diseases, covering different frequencies and sea-
sonalities. The C1, C2, and C3 methods have detected out-
breaks of public health interest, including West Nile
disease and the start of the influenza season. 
C1, C2, and C3 demonstrate consistency over the vari-
ous situations represented in these simulations. Other aber-
ration detection methods exist, as do other simulated
datasets. The simulated datasets presented in this paper
cover a larger variety of types of data that might be expect-
ed in public health. These simulated datasets also include
enough past years of data so that methods that require 5
years of historical information can also be used in the com-
parisons. These simulations provide a method to fairly
compare other methods among themselves and to the
methods included in EARS.
The simulations were based on means and SDs to help
determine which method performs better under which cir-
cumstances. When deciding which method to use, the
potential user should base the decision on the sensitivity or
specificity or the time to detection. 
A potential limitation is that the method for calculating
average times to detection disregards undetected out-
breaks. Therefore, times to detection should not be consid-
ered without also taking into account the sensitivity.
However, this method was preferred over the alternative of
assigning arbitrary numbers of days to detection for out-
breaks that were not detected since the alternative method
could lead to misinterpretation of the data. Another limita-
tion is that the artificial datasets may not fully reproduce
the nuances of natural disease occurrences. While approx-
imations, the simulated data were generated based on nat-
urally observed data and included variations for trend over
time, days of the week, seasons, and holidays. Therefore,
while these comparisons represent relative sensitivities,
specificities, and times to detection, we do not know
whether results using naturally occurring data would be
consistent.
The results of this study suggest that the EARS histori-
cal methods do not have a strong advantage when com-
pared with nonhistorical methods. In fact, the lack of
historical data does not impair the EARS outbreak detec-
tion methods. This study also demonstrates the effective-
ness of artificial outbreak data in comparing and
evaluating outbreak detection methods. As aberration
detection methods are increasingly being used by state and
local health departments to monitor for naturally occurring
outbreaks and bioterror events, this study contributes to the
quest to determine the most efficient method for analyzing
surveillance data. 
Ms. Hutwagner works with the Bioterrorism Preparedness
and Response Program at the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention on developing aberration detection methods for their
national “drop-in surveillance” system and ongoing syndromic
surveillance. She has been implementing these methods at vari-
ous sites in the United States and internationally.
References
1. Teutsch SM, Churchill RE, editors. Principles and practice of public
health surveillance. New York: Oxford University Press; 2000.
2. Stroup DF, Williamson GD, Herndon JL, Karon J. Detection of aber-
rations in the occurrence of notifiable diseases surveillance data. Stat
Med. 1989;8:323–9.
3. Farrington CP, Andrews NJ, Beale AD, Catchpole MA. A statistical
algorithm for the early detection of outbreaks of infectious disease. J
R Stat Soc Ser A Stat Soc. 1996;159:547–63.
4. Simonsen L, Clarke JM, Stroup DF, Williamson GD, Arden NH, Cox
NJ. A method for timely assessment of influenza-associated mortali-
ty in the United States. Epidemiology. 1997;8:390–5.
5. Hutwagner LC, Maloney EK, Bean NH, Slutsker L, Martin SM.
Using laboratory-based surveillance data for prevention: an algorithm
for detecting salmonella outbreaks. Emerg Infect Dis.
1997;3:395–400.  
6. Stern L, Lightfoot D. Automated outbreak detection: a quantitative
retrospective analysis. Epidemiol Infect. 1999;122:103–10.
7. Hutwagner L, Thompson W, Seeman GM, Treadwell T. The bioter-
rorism preparedness and response Early Aberration Reporting System
(EARS). J Urban Health. 2003;80:i89–96.
8. Hutwagner L, Thompson W, Groseclose S, Williamson GD. An eval-
uation of alternative methods for detecting aberrations in public
health surveillance data. American Statistical Association, Joint
Statistical Meetings, Proceedings of the Biometrics Section.
Indianapolis; 2000 Aug. p. 82–5.
Address for correspondence: Lori Hutwagner, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd, Mailstop C18, Atlanta, GA
30333, USA; fax: 404-639-0382; email: lhutwagner@cdc.gov
DISPATCHES
316 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 11, No. 2, February 2005